0347865 20240103193928.420101103235959.9 000287979900064 4 s. cav_un_epca*0346970978-80-7394-218-2337-380České BudějoviceUniversity of South Bohemia2010HoudaM.FriebelováJ. Concentration game pexeso perfect players cav_un_auth*0264564 Kuběna Aleš Antonín Ekonometrie Department of Econometrics E E UTIA-B Department of Econometrics Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2010/E/kubena-pexeso (concentration game) as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.pdf GD402/09/H045 GA ČR cav_un_auth*0253998 CEZ:AV0Z10750506 Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with ”stalemate” (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero. cav_un_auth*0264432 28-th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics České Budějovice 08.09.2010-10.09.2010 CZ 2011 AH http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0188542 2010 000287979900064 WOS cav_un_epca*0346970 Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010 978-80-7394-218-2 337 380 České Budějovice University of South Bohemia 2010 Houda M. 340 Friebelová J. 340