0359839 20240103195217.220110601235959.9 000290588300006 79956159799 10.1093/logcom/exp015 14 s. cav_un_epca*02538590955-792X213 (2011)479-492 coalition game core MV-algebra cav_un_auth*0101141 Kroupa Tomáš Matematická teorie rozhodování Department of Decision Making Theory MTR MTR UTIA-B Department of Decision Making Theory Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2011/MTR/kroupa-0359839.pdf 1M0572 GA MŠk cav_un_auth*0001814 GA102/08/0567 GA ČR cav_un_auth*0239566 CEZ:AV0Z10750506 Coalition games are generalized to semisimple MV-algebras. Coalitions are viewed as [0,1]-valued functions on a set of players, which enables to express a degree of membership of a player in a coalition. Every game is a real-valued mapping on a semisimple MV-algebra. The goal is to recover the so-called core: a set of final distributions of payoffs, which are represented by measures on the MV-algebra. A class of sublinear games are shown to have a non-empty core and the core is completely characterized in certain special cases. The interpretation of games on propositional formulas in Łukasiewicz logic is introduced. 2012 BA 4 A 4a 20231122134547.1 http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0197545 COMPUTERSCIENCETHEORYMETHODS|LOGIC 0.567 0.038 8.5 0.00218 0.486 424 52 0.804 Q1 38.951 57.709 Q3 Q2 2011 Soubory v repozitáři: kroupa-0359839.pdf 79956159799 SCOPUS 000290588300006 WOS cav_un_epca*0253859 Journal of Logic and Computation 0955-792X 1465-363X Roč. 21 č. 3 2011 479 492