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<bibitem type="J">   <ARLID>0456358</ARLID> <utime>20240103211901.2</utime><mtime>20160210235959.9</mtime>   <SCOPUS>84974667725</SCOPUS> <WOS>000377662400003</WOS>  <DOI>10.1093/jigpal/jzw004</DOI>           <title language="eng" primary="1">Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria in Many-Valued Logics</title>  <specification> <page_count>30 s.</page_count> </specification>   <serial><ARLID>cav_un_epca*0258358</ARLID><ISSN>1367-0751</ISSN><title>Logic Journal of the IGPL</title><part_num/><part_title/><volume_id>24</volume_id><volume>3 (2016)</volume><page_num>238-267</page_num><publisher><place/><name>Oxford University Press</name><year/></publisher></serial>    <keyword>strategic games</keyword>   <keyword>many-valued logics</keyword>   <keyword>Nash equilibria</keyword>   <keyword>Lukasiewicz games</keyword>    <author primary="1"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0107898</ARLID> <name1>Běhounek</name1> <name2>Libor</name2> <full_dept language="cz">Oddělení teoretické informatiky</full_dept> <full_dept language="eng">Department of Theoretical Computer Science</full_dept> <institution>UIVT-O</institution> <full_dept>Department of Theoretical Computer Science</full_dept> <fullinstit>Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0100737</ARLID> <name1>Cintula</name1> <name2>Petr</name2> <full_dept language="cz">Oddělení teoretické informatiky</full_dept> <full_dept>Department of Theoretical Computer Science</full_dept> <institution>UIVT-O</institution> <full_dept>Department of Theoretical Computer Science</full_dept> <fullinstit>Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0279191</ARLID> <name1>Fermüller</name1> <name2>C.</name2> <country>AT</country> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0101141</ARLID> <name1>Kroupa</name1> <name2>Tomáš</name2> <full_dept language="cz">Matematická teorie rozhodování</full_dept> <full_dept>Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <department language="cz">MTR</department> <department>MTR</department> <institution>UTIA-B</institution> <full_dept>Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <fullinstit>Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author>        <cas_special> <project> <project_id>GAP402/12/1309</project_id> <agency>GA ČR</agency> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0284931</ARLID> </project> <project> <project_id>7AMB13AT014</project_id> <agency>GA MŠk</agency> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0291240</ARLID> </project> <project> <project_id>GF15-34650L</project_id> <agency>GA ČR</agency> <country>CZ</country> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0323282</ARLID> </project> <project> <project_id>P25417-G15</project_id> <agency>Austrian Science Fund</agency> <country>AT</country> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0328077</ARLID> </project> <project> <project_id>I1897-N25</project_id> <agency>Austrian Science Fund</agency> <country>AT</country> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0328078</ARLID> </project>  <abstract language="eng" primary="1">We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games.</abstract>     <RIV>BA</RIV>   <reportyear>2017</reportyear>      <unknown tag="mrcbC52"> 4 O A 4o 4a 20231122141533.0 </unknown> <inst_support> RVO:67985807 </inst_support> <inst_support> RVO:67985556 </inst_support>  <permalink>http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0256881</permalink>   <confidential>S</confidential>  <unknown tag="mrcbC86"> 3+4 Article Mathematics Applied|Mathematics|Logic  </unknown>        <unknown tag="mrcbT16-e">MATHEMATICS|MATHEMATICS.APPLIED|LOGIC</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-f">0.596</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-g">0.073</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-h">6.5</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-i">0.0015</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-j">0.37</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-k">373</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-s">0.430</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-4">Q1</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-5">0.500</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-6">55</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-7">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-B">27.853</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-C">35.4</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-D">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-E">Q2</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-P">45.238</unknown> <arlyear>2016</arlyear>    <unknown tag="mrcbTft">  Soubory v repozitáři: a0456358post.pdf, a0456358.pdf </unknown>    <unknown tag="mrcbU14"> 84974667725 SCOPUS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU24"> PUBMED </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU34"> 000377662400003 WOS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU63"> cav_un_epca*0258358 Logic Journal of the IGPL 1367-0751 1368-9894 Roč. 24 č. 3 2016 238 267 Oxford University Press </unknown> </cas_special> </bibitem>