0468195 20240103213252.220170103235959.9 84992153625 000401196500011 10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981 13 s. P cav_un_epca*02582180233-1934666 (2017)1013-1025Taylor & Francis Electricity market multi-leader-follower game Nash equilibrium best response cav_un_auth*0298685 33 Aussel D. FR K cav_un_auth*0340984 33 Bendotti P. FR cav_un_auth*0234872 Matematická teorie rozhodování Department of Decision Making Theory MTR MTR Department of Decision Making Theory 34 Pištěk Miroslav UTIA-B CZ Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2016/MTR/pistek-0468195.pdf cav_un_auth*0321507 GA15-00735S GA ČR We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multileader-common-follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator as a common follower is at the lower level. We fully characterize Nash equilibria for this model by describing necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence as well as providing explicit formulas of such equilibria in the market. AH 50000 50200 50201 2018 3 RVO:67985556 http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0266867 S 3+4 Article Operations Research Management Science|Mathematics Applied 1 Article Operations Research Management Science|Mathematics Applied 1 Article Operations Research Management Science|Mathematics Applied OPERATIONSRESEARCH&MANAGEMENTSCIENCE|MATHEMATICS.APPLIED 1.084 0.159 7.2 0.00428 0.553 1483 0.736 1.047 126 Q2 35.932 47.6 Q3 Q2 0.71 Q2 62.5 2017 84992153625 SCOPUS PUBMED 000401196500011 WOS cav_un_epca*0258218 Optimization 0233-1934 1029-4945 Roč. 66 č. 6 2017 1013 1025 Taylor & Francis