0476341 20240103214300.320170720235959.9 IMPERFECT DECISION MAKERS Rationality Bayesian theory limited cognitive resources cav_un_auth*0101124 Adaptivní systémy Department of Adaptive Systems AS AS Department of Adaptive Systems 40 Kárný Miroslav UTIA-B Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. cav_un_auth*0101092 Adaptivní systémy Department of Adaptive Systems AS AS Department of Adaptive Systems 60 Guy Tatiana Valentine UTIA-B Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. http://www.utia.cz/imperfectDM cav_un_auth*0331019 GA16-09848S GA ČR The prescriptive Bayesian theory of decision making (DM) under uncertainty has reached a high level of maturity. The assumption that the decision maker is rational (i.e. that they optimize expected utility, in Savage's formulation) is central to this theory. However, empirical research indicates that this central assumption is often violated by real decision makers. This limits the ability of the prescriptive Bayesian theory to provide a descriptive theory of the real world. One of the reasons that have been proposed for why the assumption of rationality might be violated by real decision makers is the limited cognitive and computational resources of those decision makers. This workshop intends to inspect this core assumption and to consider possible ways to modify or complement it. 20161209 20161209 Barcelona ES http://www.utia.cz/imperfectDM BC 10000 10200 10201 2018 2 RVO:67985556 http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0273532 1 S 2016