0485377 20240103215437.520180123235959.9 85031418084 000415640700002 10.1080/03081079.2017.1388800 16 s. P cav_un_epca*02567940308-1079471 (2018)51-66Taylor & Francis Bi-cooperative games bipolar fuzzy bi-coalition Shapley function cav_un_auth*0314961 30 Hazarika P. IN cav_un_auth*0316231 35 Borkotokey S. IN K cav_un_auth*0101163 Ekonometrie Department of Econometrics E E Department of Econometrics 35 Mesiar Radko UTIA-B S Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2018/E/mesiar-0485377.pdf In this paper, we introduce the notion of a bi-cooperative game with Bipolar Fuzzy Bi-coalitions and discuss the related properties. In many decision-making situations, players show bipolar motives while cooperating among themselves. This is modelled in both crisp and fuzzy environments. Bi-cooperative games with fuzzy bi-coalitions have already been proposed under the product order of bi-coalitions where one had memberships in [0,1]. In the present paper, we adopt the alternative ordering: ordering by monotonicity and account for players' memberships in [-1, 1], a break from the previous formulation. This simplifies the model to a great extent. The corresponding Shapley axioms are proposed. An explicit form of the Shapley value to a particular class of such games is also obtained. Our study is supplemented with an illustrative example. BA 10000 10100 10101 2019 3 RVO:67985556 http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0281413 S 3+4 Article Computer Science Theory Methods|Ergonomics COMPUTERSCIENCE.THEORY&METHODS 2.169 0.422 12.2 0.00165 0.543 1624 0.855 1.835 45 Q2 52.377 69 Q2 Q2 1.06 Q1 69.048 2018 85031418084 SCOPUS PUBMED 000415640700002 WOS cav_un_epca*0256794 International Journal of General Systems 0308-1079 1563-5104 Roč. 47 č. 1 2018 51 66 Taylor & Francis