0508237 20240103222520.220190911235959.9 1 s. E cav_un_epca*0508236113-113PragueDLMPST/IUHPST2019 cav_un_auth*0100737 Cintula Petr Oddělení teoretické informatiky Department of Theoretical Computer Science UIVT-O Department of Theoretical Computer Science Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i. cav_un_auth*0293476 Noguera Carles Matematická teorie rozhodování Department of Decision Making Theory MTR MTR UTIA-B Department of Decision Making Theory Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. cav_un_auth*0379481 Smith N. AU http://clmpst2019.flu.cas.cz/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/BoA_CLMPST2019_web.pdf The sorites paradox has been intensively discussed in the literature and several competing theories of vagueness have emerged. Given a vague predicate F and a sequence of objects 1, 2, ..., n, such that: F(1) is true, F(n) is false, and for each i, the objects i and i+1 are extremely similar in all respects relevant to the application of F; the sorites paradox is an argument which, based on two apparently true premises F(1) and “for each i: F(i) implies F(i+1)”, after n applications of modus ponens reaches the clearly false conclusion F(n). cav_un_auth*0379482 CLMPST 2019: The International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology /16./ 20191005 Prague CZ 20191010 2020 4 O 4o 20231122144234.6 RVO:67985807 http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0299204 S 2019 Soubory v repozitáři: 508237-aw.pdf SCOPUS PUBMED WOS cav_un_epca*0508236 CLMPST 2019. Book of Abstracts 113 113 Prague DLMPST/IUHPST 2019