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<bibitem type="J">   <ARLID>0531319</ARLID> <utime>20240103224259.3</utime><mtime>20200731235959.9</mtime>   <SCOPUS>85088297119</SCOPUS> <WOS>000551004500001</WOS>  <DOI>10.1007/s00186-020-00721-x</DOI>           <title language="eng" primary="1">On computation of optimal strategies in oligopolistic markets respecting the cost of change</title>  <specification> <page_count>21 s.</page_count> <media_type>P</media_type> </specification>   <serial><ARLID>cav_un_epca*0254275</ARLID><ISSN>1432-2994</ISSN><title>Mathematical Methods of Operations Research</title><part_num/><part_title/><volume_id>92</volume_id><volume>3 (2020)</volume><page_num>489-509</page_num><publisher><place/><name>Springer</name><year/></publisher></serial>    <keyword>Generalized equation</keyword>   <keyword>Equilibrium</keyword>   <keyword>Cost of Change</keyword>    <author primary="1"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0101173</ARLID> <name1>Outrata</name1> <name2>Jiří</name2> <institution>UTIA-B</institution> <full_dept language="cz">Matematická teorie rozhodování</full_dept> <full_dept language="eng">Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <department language="cz">MTR</department> <department language="eng">MTR</department> <full_dept>Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <fullinstit>Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0292941</ARLID> <name1>Valdman</name1> <name2>Jan</name2> <institution>UTIA-B</institution> <full_dept language="cz">Matematická teorie rozhodování</full_dept> <full_dept>Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <department language="cz">MTR</department> <department>MTR</department> <full_dept>Department of Decision Making Theory</full_dept> <fullinstit>Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author>   <source> <url>http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2020/MTR/outrata-0531319.pdf</url> </source> <source> <url>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00186-020-00721-x</url>  </source>        <cas_special> <project> <project_id>GA17-08182S</project_id> <agency>GA ČR</agency> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0348851</ARLID> </project> <project> <project_id>GA17-04301S</project_id> <agency>GA ČR</agency> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0347023</ARLID> </project>  <abstract language="eng" primary="1">The paper deals with a class of parameterized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the second kind, whose Lipschitzian stability, under appropriate conditions, is established. This theory is then applied to evolution of an oligopolistic market in which the firms adapt their production strategies to changing input costs, while each change of the production is associated with some “costs of change”. We examine both the Cournot-Nash equilibria as well as the two-level case, when one firm decides to take over the role of the Leader (Stackelberg equilibrium). The impact of costs of change is illustrated by academic examples.</abstract>     <result_subspec>WOS</result_subspec> <RIV>BA</RIV> <FORD0>10000</FORD0> <FORD1>10100</FORD1> <FORD2>10101</FORD2>    <reportyear>2021</reportyear>     <inst_support> RVO:67985556 </inst_support>  <permalink>http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0309996</permalink>   <confidential>S</confidential>  <unknown tag="mrcbC86"> 3+4 Article Operations Research Management Science|Mathematics Applied </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbC91"> A </unknown>         <unknown tag="mrcbT16-e">OPERATIONSRESEARCH&amp;MANAGEMENTSCIENCE|MATHEMATICS.APPLIED</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-f">1.503</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-g">0.34</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-h">13.1</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-i">0.00125</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-j">0.653</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-k">1278</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-q">56</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-s">0.524</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-y">31.37</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-x">1.14</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-3">146</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-4">Q2</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-5">1.271</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-6">50</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-7">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-B">37.3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-C">33.3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-D">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-E">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-M">0.47</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-N">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-P">48.113</unknown> <arlyear>2020</arlyear>       <unknown tag="mrcbU14"> 85088297119 SCOPUS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU24"> PUBMED </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU34"> 000551004500001 WOS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU63"> cav_un_epca*0254275 Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 1432-2994 1432-5217 Roč. 92 č. 3 2020 489 509 Springer </unknown> </cas_special> </bibitem>