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<bibitem type="J">   <ARLID>0562376</ARLID> <utime>20240103230926.7</utime><mtime>20221014235959.9</mtime>   <SCOPUS>85139393431</SCOPUS> <WOS>000866441700001</WOS>  <DOI>10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3210506</DOI>           <title language="eng" primary="1">Indirect Dynamic Negotiation in the Nash Demand Game</title>  <specification> <page_count>14 s.</page_count> <media_type>E</media_type> </specification>   <serial><ARLID>cav_un_epca*0461036</ARLID><ISSN>2169-3536</ISSN><title>IEEE Access</title><part_num/><part_title/><volume_id>10</volume_id><volume>1 (2022)</volume><page_num>105008-105021</page_num><publisher><place/><name>Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers</name><year/></publisher></serial>    <keyword>Learning systems</keyword>   <keyword>Bayes methods</keyword>   <keyword>Markov processes</keyword>   <keyword>Biological system modeling</keyword>   <keyword>Uncertainty</keyword>   <keyword>Nash equilibrium</keyword>   <keyword>Resource management</keyword>    <author primary="1"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0437960</ARLID> <name1>Guy</name1> <name2>T. V.</name2> <country>CZ</country> <share>50</share> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0202365</ARLID> <name1>Homolová</name1> <name2>Jitka</name2> <institution>UTIA-B</institution> <full_dept language="cz">Adaptivní systémy</full_dept> <full_dept>Department of Adaptive Systems</full_dept> <department language="cz">AS</department> <department>AS</department> <country>CZ</country> <share>40</share> <fullinstit>Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.</fullinstit> </author> <author primary="0"> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0437961</ARLID> <name1>Gaj</name1> <name2>A.</name2> <country>CZ</country> <share>10</share> </author>   <source> <url>http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2022/AS/homolova-0562376.pdf</url> </source> <source> <url>https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9905577</url>  </source>        <cas_special> <project> <project_id>LTC18075</project_id> <agency>GA MŠk</agency> <country>CZ</country> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0372050</ARLID> </project>  <abstract language="eng" primary="1">The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent’s model. Methodologically the paper casts heuristically-motivated bargaining of a self-interested independent player into a framework of Bayesian learning and Markov decision processes. The special form of the reward implicitly motivates the players to negotiate indirectly, via closed-loop interaction. We illustrate the approach by applying our model to the Nash demand game, which is an abstract model of bargaining. The results indicate that the established negotiation: i) leads to coordinating players’ actions. ii) results in maximising success rate of the game and iii) brings more individual profit to the players.</abstract>     <result_subspec>WOS</result_subspec> <RIV>BC</RIV> <FORD0>20000</FORD0> <FORD1>20200</FORD1> <FORD2>20205</FORD2>    <reportyear>2023</reportyear>      <num_of_auth>3</num_of_auth>  <inst_support> RVO:67985556 </inst_support>  <permalink>https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0334712</permalink>  <cooperation> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0299698</ARLID> <name>Česká zemědělská univerzita Praha</name> <institution>ČZU</institution> <country>CZ</country> </cooperation> <cooperation> <ARLID>cav_un_auth*0329918</ARLID> <name>FJFI ČVUT Praha</name> <country>CZ</country> </cooperation>  <confidential>S</confidential>  <unknown tag="mrcbC86"> 3+4 Article Computer Science Information Systems|Engineering Electrical Electronic|Telecommunications </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbC91"> A </unknown>         <unknown tag="mrcbT16-e">COMPUTERSCIENCE.INFORMATIONSYSTEMS|ENGINEERING.ELECTRICAL&amp;ELECTRONIC|TELECOMMUNICATIONS</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-f">4.1</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-g">0.7</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-h">2.9</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-i">0.32756</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-j">0.685</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-k">239575</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-s">0.926</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-5">3.600</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-6">9547</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-7">Q2</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-C">57.3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-D">Q3</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-E">Q2</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-M">0.89</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-N">Q2</unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbT16-P">63.8</unknown> <arlyear>2022</arlyear>       <unknown tag="mrcbU14"> 85139393431 SCOPUS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU24"> PUBMED </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU34"> 000866441700001 WOS </unknown> <unknown tag="mrcbU63"> cav_un_epca*0461036 IEEE Access 2169-3536 2169-3536 Roč. 10 č. 1 2022 105008 105021 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers </unknown> </cas_special> </bibitem>