| bibtype |
J -
Journal Article
|
| ARLID |
0393906 |
| utime |
20240903170626.5 |
| mtime |
20130822235959.9 |
| WOS |
000322858500003 |
| SCOPUS |
84881304978 |
| title
(primary) (eng) |
Simple games in Lukasiewicz calculus and their cores |
| specification |
| page_count |
16 s. |
| media_type |
P |
|
| serial |
| ARLID |
cav_un_epca*0297163 |
| ISSN |
0023-5954 |
| title
|
Kybernetika |
| volume_id |
49 |
| volume |
3 (2013) |
| page_num |
404-419 |
| publisher |
| name |
Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. |
|
|
| keyword |
simple game |
| keyword |
game with fuzzy coalitions |
| keyword |
core |
| keyword |
McNaughton function |
| keyword |
Lukasiewicz logic |
| author
(primary) |
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0100737 |
| name1 |
Cintula |
| name2 |
Petr |
| full_dept (cz) |
Oddělení teoretické informatiky |
| full_dept (eng) |
Department of Theoretical Computer Science |
| institution |
UIVT-O |
| full_dept |
Department of Theoretical Computer Science |
| fullinstit |
Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i. |
|
| author
|
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0101141 |
| name1 |
Kroupa |
| name2 |
Tomáš |
| full_dept (cz) |
Matematická teorie rozhodování |
| full_dept |
Department of Decision Making Theory |
| department (cz) |
MTR |
| department |
MTR |
| institution |
UTIA-B |
| full_dept |
Department of Decision Making Theory |
| fullinstit |
Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. |
|
| source |
|
| cas_special |
| project |
| project_id |
GAP402/12/1309 |
| agency |
GA ČR |
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0284931 |
|
| abstract
(eng) |
We propose a generalization of simple coalition games in the context of games with fuzzy coalitions. Mimicking the correspondence of simple games with non-constant monotone formulas of classical logic, we introduce simple Lukasiewicz games using monotone formulas of Lukasiewicz logic, one of the most prominent fuzzy logics. We study the core solution on the class of simple Lukasiewicz games and show that cores of such games are determined by finitely-many linear constraints only. The non-emptiness of core is completely characterized in terms of balanced systems and by the presence of strong veto players. |
| reportyear |
2014 |
| RIV |
BA |
| num_of_auth |
2 |
| mrcbC52 |
4 O 4o 20231122135657.8 |
| inst_support |
RVO:67985807 |
| inst_support |
RVO:67985556 |
| permalink |
http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0222591 |
| mrcbT16-e |
COMPUTERSCIENCECYBERNETICS |
| mrcbT16-f |
0.577 |
| mrcbT16-g |
0.098 |
| mrcbT16-h |
9.IV |
| mrcbT16-i |
0.00191 |
| mrcbT16-j |
0.341 |
| mrcbT16-k |
655 |
| mrcbT16-l |
61 |
| mrcbT16-s |
0.348 |
| mrcbT16-z |
ScienceCitationIndexExpanded |
| mrcbT16-4 |
Q2 |
| mrcbT16-B |
35.159 |
| mrcbT16-C |
31.250 |
| mrcbT16-D |
Q3 |
| mrcbT16-E |
Q3 |
| arlyear |
2013 |
| mrcbTft |
\nSoubory v repozitáři: Kybernetika_49-2013-3_3.pdf |
| mrcbU14 |
84881304978 SCOPUS |
| mrcbU34 |
000322858500003 WOS |
| mrcbU63 |
cav_un_epca*0297163 Kybernetika 0023-5954 Roč. 49 č. 3 2013 404 419 Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. |
|