bibtype	J - Journal Article
ARLID	0456358
utime	20240103211901.2
mtime	20160210235959.9
SCOPUS	84974667725
WOS	000377662400003
DOI	10.1093/jigpal/jzw004
title (primary) (eng)	Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria in Many-Valued Logics
specification	page_count 30 s.
serial	ARLID cav_un_epca*0258358 ISSN 1367-0751 title Logic Journal of the IGPL volume_id 24 volume 3 (2016) page_num 238-267 publisher name Oxford University Press
keyword	strategic games
keyword	many-valued logics
keyword	Nash equilibria
keyword	Lukasiewicz games
author (primary)	ARLID cav_un_auth*0107898 name1 Běhounek name2 Libor full_dept (cz) Oddělení teoretické informatiky full_dept (eng) Department of Theoretical Computer Science institution UIVT-O full_dept Department of Theoretical Computer Science fullinstit Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i.
author	ARLID cav_un_auth*0100737 name1 Cintula name2 Petr full_dept (cz) Oddělení teoretické informatiky full_dept Department of Theoretical Computer Science institution UIVT-O full_dept Department of Theoretical Computer Science fullinstit Ústav informatiky AV ČR, v. v. i.
author	ARLID cav_un_auth*0279191 name1 Fermüller name2 C. country AT
author	ARLID cav_un_auth*0101141 name1 Kroupa name2 Tomáš full_dept (cz) Matematická teorie rozhodování full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory department (cz) MTR department MTR institution UTIA-B full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory fullinstit Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.
cas_special	project project_id GAP402/12/1309 agency GA ČR ARLID cav_un_auth*0284931 project project_id 7AMB13AT014 agency GA MŠk ARLID cav_un_auth*0291240 project project_id GF15-34650L agency GA ČR country CZ ARLID cav_un_auth*0323282 project project_id P25417-G15 agency Austrian Science Fund country AT ARLID cav_un_auth*0328077 project project_id I1897-N25 agency Austrian Science Fund country AT ARLID cav_un_auth*0328078 abstract (eng) We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games. RIV BA reportyear 2017 mrcbC52 4 O A 4o 4a 20231122141533.0 inst_support RVO:67985807 inst_support RVO:67985556 permalink http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0256881 confidential S mrcbC86 3+4 Article Mathematics Applied|Mathematics|Logic mrcbT16-e MATHEMATICS|MATHEMATICS.APPLIED|LOGIC mrcbT16-f 0.596 mrcbT16-g 0.073 mrcbT16-h 6.5 mrcbT16-i 0.0015 mrcbT16-j 0.37 mrcbT16-k 373 mrcbT16-s 0.430 mrcbT16-4 Q1 mrcbT16-5 0.500 mrcbT16-6 55 mrcbT16-7 Q3 mrcbT16-B 27.853 mrcbT16-C 35.4 mrcbT16-D Q3 mrcbT16-E Q2 mrcbT16-P 45.238 arlyear 2016 mrcbTft \nSoubory v repozitáři: a0456358post.pdf, a0456358.pdf mrcbU14 84974667725 SCOPUS mrcbU24 PUBMED mrcbU34 000377662400003 WOS mrcbU63 cav_un_epca*0258358 Logic Journal of the IGPL 1367-0751 1368-9894 Roč. 24 č. 3 2016 238 267 Oxford University Press