| bibtype |
J -
Journal Article
|
| ARLID |
0467365 |
| utime |
20240103213153.5 |
| mtime |
20161215235959.9 |
| SCOPUS |
84997171421 |
| WOS |
000413759000001 |
| DOI |
10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3 |
| title
(primary) (eng) |
The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdi erential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set |
| specification |
| page_count |
28 s. |
| media_type |
P |
|
| serial |
| ARLID |
cav_un_epca*0251007 |
| ISSN |
0020-7276 |
| title
|
International Journal of Game Theory |
| volume_id |
46 |
| volume |
4 (2017) |
| page_num |
891-918 |
| publisher |
|
|
| keyword |
coalition game |
| keyword |
limiting superdi erential |
| keyword |
intermediate set |
| keyword |
core |
| keyword |
Weber set |
| author
(primary) |
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0309054 |
| name1 |
Adam |
| name2 |
Lukáš |
| full_dept (cz) |
Matematická teorie rozhodování |
| full_dept (eng) |
Department of Decision Making Theory |
| department (cz) |
MTR |
| department (eng) |
MTR |
| institution |
UTIA-B |
| full_dept |
Department of Decision Making Theory |
| country |
CZ |
| fullinstit |
Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i. |
|
| author
|
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0015063 |
| name1 |
Kroupa |
| name2 |
T. |
| country |
CZ |
|
| source |
|
| cas_special |
| project |
| ARLID |
cav_un_auth*0321507 |
| project_id |
GA15-00735S |
| agency |
GA ČR |
|
| abstract
(eng) |
We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is de ned as the limiting superdi erential of the Lov asz extension and thus it completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core (Fr echet superdi erential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdi erential). It is shown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payo vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide its simpli ed characterization for the simple games and the glove game. |
| RIV |
BA |
| FORD0 |
10000 |
| FORD1 |
10100 |
| FORD2 |
10103 |
| reportyear |
2018 |
| num_of_auth |
2 |
| inst_support |
RVO:67985556 |
| permalink |
http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0266441 |
| confidential |
S |
| mrcbC86 |
2 Article Economics|Mathematics Interdisciplinary Applications|Social Sciences Mathematical Methods|Statistics Probability |
| mrcbC86 |
3+4 Article Economics|Mathematics Interdisciplinary Applications|Social Sciences Mathematical Methods|Statistics Probability |
| mrcbC86 |
3+4 Article Economics|Mathematics Interdisciplinary Applications|Social Sciences Mathematical Methods|Statistics Probability |
| mrcbT16-e |
ECONOMICS|MATHEMATICSINTERDISCIPLINARYAPPLICATIONS|SOCIALSCIENCESMATHEMATICALMETHODS|STATISTICSPROBABILITY |
| mrcbT16-j |
0.62 |
| mrcbT16-s |
0.564 |
| mrcbT16-B |
43.007 |
| mrcbT16-D |
Q3 |
| mrcbT16-E |
Q2 |
| arlyear |
2017 |
| mrcbU14 |
84997171421 SCOPUS |
| mrcbU24 |
PUBMED |
| mrcbU34 |
000413759000001 WOS |
| mrcbU63 |
cav_un_epca*0251007 International Journal of Game Theory 0020-7276 1432-1270 Roč. 46 č. 4 2017 891 918 Springer |
|