bibtype C - Conference Paper (international conference)
ARLID 0467447
utime 20240103213159.1
mtime 20161217235959.9
SCOPUS 84977137654
WOS 000389515800004
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40596-4_4
title (primary) (eng) Computing Superdifferentials of Lovász Extension with Application to Coalitional Game
specification
page_count 11 s.
media_type P
edition
name Communications in Computer and Information Science
volume_id 610
serial
ARLID cav_un_epca*0468640
ISBN 978-3-319-40595-7
title Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU 2016)
page_num 35-45
publisher
place Cham
name Springer International
year 2016
keyword Coalitional game
keyword Lovász extension
keyword Choquet integral
keyword Core
keyword Weber set
keyword Superdifferential
author (primary)
ARLID cav_un_auth*0309054
name1 Adam
name2 Lukáš
full_dept (cz) Matematická teorie rozhodování
full_dept (eng) Department of Decision Making Theory
department (cz) MTR
department (eng) MTR
institution UTIA-B
full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory
country CZ
fullinstit Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.
author
ARLID cav_un_auth*0015063
name1 Kroupa
name2 T.
country CZ
source
url http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2016/MTR/adam-0467447.pdf
cas_special
project
ARLID cav_un_auth*0321507
project_id GA15-00735S
agency GA ČR
abstract (eng) Every coalitional game can be extended from the powerset onto the real unit cube. One of possible approaches is the Lovász extension, which is the same as the discrete Choquet integral with respect to the coalitional game. We will study some solution concepts for coalitional games (core, Weber set) using superdifferentials developed in non-smooth analysis. It has been shown that the core coincides with Fréchet superdifferential and the Weber set with Clarke superdifferential for the Lovász extension, respectively. We introduce the intermediate set as the limiting superdifferential and show that it always lies between the core and the Weber set. From the game-theoretic point of view, the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payoff vectors, which depend on some ordered partition of the players and the marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the order.
action
ARLID cav_un_auth*0340759
name International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU) 2016 /16./
dates 20160620
mrcbC20-s 20160624
place Eindhoven
country NL
RIV BA
reportyear 2017
num_of_auth 2
presentation_type PR
inst_support RVO:67985556
permalink http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0266447
confidential S
mrcbC86 3+4 Proceedings Paper Computer Science Artificial Intelligence|Computer Science Theory Methods
arlyear 2016
mrcbU12 978-3-319-40595-7
mrcbU14 84977137654 SCOPUS
mrcbU24 PUBMED
mrcbU34 000389515800004 WOS
mrcbU63 cav_un_epca*0468640 Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU 2016) 978-3-319-40595-7 35 45 Cham Springer International 2016 Communications in Computer and Information Science 610