bibtype J - Journal Article
ARLID 0531319
utime 20240103224259.3
mtime 20200731235959.9
SCOPUS 85088297119
WOS 000551004500001
DOI 10.1007/s00186-020-00721-x
title (primary) (eng) On computation of optimal strategies in oligopolistic markets respecting the cost of change
specification
page_count 21 s.
media_type P
serial
ARLID cav_un_epca*0254275
ISSN 1432-2994
title Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
volume_id 92
volume 3 (2020)
page_num 489-509
publisher
name Springer
keyword Generalized equation
keyword Equilibrium
keyword Cost of Change
author (primary)
ARLID cav_un_auth*0101173
name1 Outrata
name2 Jiří
institution UTIA-B
full_dept (cz) Matematická teorie rozhodování
full_dept (eng) Department of Decision Making Theory
department (cz) MTR
department (eng) MTR
full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory
fullinstit Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.
author
ARLID cav_un_auth*0292941
name1 Valdman
name2 Jan
institution UTIA-B
full_dept (cz) Matematická teorie rozhodování
full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory
department (cz) MTR
department MTR
full_dept Department of Decision Making Theory
fullinstit Ústav teorie informace a automatizace AV ČR, v. v. i.
source
url http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2020/MTR/outrata-0531319.pdf
source
url https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00186-020-00721-x
cas_special
project
project_id GA17-08182S
agency GA ČR
ARLID cav_un_auth*0348851
project
project_id GA17-04301S
agency GA ČR
ARLID cav_un_auth*0347023
abstract (eng) The paper deals with a class of parameterized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the second kind, whose Lipschitzian stability, under appropriate conditions, is established. This theory is then applied to evolution of an oligopolistic market in which the firms adapt their production strategies to changing input costs, while each change of the production is associated with some “costs of change”. We examine both the Cournot-Nash equilibria as well as the two-level case, when one firm decides to take over the role of the Leader (Stackelberg equilibrium). The impact of costs of change is illustrated by academic examples.
result_subspec WOS
RIV BA
FORD0 10000
FORD1 10100
FORD2 10101
reportyear 2021
inst_support RVO:67985556
permalink http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0309996
confidential S
mrcbC86 3+4 Article Operations Research Management Science|Mathematics Applied
mrcbC91 A
mrcbT16-e MATHEMATICSAPPLIED|OPERATIONSRESEARCHMANAGEMENTSCIENCE
mrcbT16-i 0.00125
mrcbT16-j 0.653
mrcbT16-s 0.524
mrcbT16-B 37.3
mrcbT16-D Q3
mrcbT16-E Q3
arlyear 2020
mrcbU14 85088297119 SCOPUS
mrcbU24 PUBMED
mrcbU34 000551004500001 WOS
mrcbU63 cav_un_epca*0254275 Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 1432-2994 1432-5217 Roč. 92 č. 3 2020 489 509 Springer